Modeling the morning commute for urban networks with cruising-for-parking: An MFD approach by Liu, Wei & Geroliminis, Nikolaos
Transportation Research Part B 93 (2016) 470–494 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Transportation Research Part B 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/trb 
Modeling the morning commute for urban networks with 
cruising-for-parking: An MFD approach 
Wei Liu, Nikolas Geroliminis ∗
Urban Transport Systems Laboratory (LUTS) , École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 10 March 2015 
Revised 10 August 2016 
Accepted 13 August 2016 
Keywords: 
Morning commute 
Cruising-for-parking 
MFD 
Pricing 
a b s t r a c t 
This study focuses on the morning commute problem with explicit consideration of 
cruising-for-parking, and its adverse impacts on traﬃc congestion. The cruising-for-parking 
is modeled through a dynamic aggregated traﬃc model for networks: the Macroscopic 
Fundamental Diagram (MFD). Firstly, we formulate the commuting equilibrium in a con- 
gested downtown network where travelers have to cruise for curbside parking spaces. The 
cruising-for-parking would yield longer trip distance and smaller network outﬂow, and 
thus can induce severe congestion and lengthen the morning peak. We then develop a dy- 
namic model of pricing for the network to reduce total social cost, which includes cruising 
time cost, moving time cost (moving or in-transit time, which is the duration during which 
vehicles move close to the destination but do not cruise for parking yet), and schedule de- 
lay cost. We show that under speciﬁc assumptions, at the system optimum, the downtown 
network should be operating at the maximum production of its MFD. However, the cruis- 
ing effect is not fully eliminated. We also show that the time-dependent toll to support 
the system optimum has a different shape than the classical ﬁne toll in Vickrey’s bot- 
tleneck model. In the end, analytical results are illustrated and veriﬁed with numerical 
experiments. 
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Parking is not only a headache for travelers heading for the city center, but also a challenging issue for the transport
system planners, operators and regulators. In some cities, the time spent on searching for a vacant parking space can be up
to 40% of the total travel time ( Axhausen et al. 1994 ), due to the limitation of parking supply. Shoup (2006) summarized
the ﬁndings of several studies done between 1927 and 2001, which show that between 8 and 74 percent of the traﬃc was
cruising for parking, and the average time to ﬁnd a curb space can be up to 14 minutes. However, those studies summarized
in Shoup (2006) generally will report locations where cruising for parking cannot be neglected. Cruising might be less
signiﬁcant, especially for those areas with suﬃcient parking and low demand. More empirical evidence for cruising is needed
for a more comprehensive understanding. Cruising-for-parking can also inﬂuence drivers not involved in cruising and create
severe congestion even under medium demand conditions (“medium travel demand” will lead to no or very light congestion
if travelers can ﬁnd parking very easily when they are close to ﬁnal destinations, and do not cruise for parking). This is
because the outﬂow of the transport network (arrivals to the parking spaces) can reach very low values when ﬁnding a
vacant parking space is extremely diﬃcult ( Geroliminis, 2015 ). Due to its ineﬃciency, cruising-for-parking is one of the∗ Corresponding author. 
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 most studied topics in the economics of parking. Understanding the effect of cruising-for-parking for congested networks
can help improve eﬃciency in the ﬂow of vehicles and facilitate the development of more equitable management strategies
as trips with cruising might contribute to congestion more than trips without that, e.g. trips with destinations outside the
limited parking zones. 
Glazer and Niskanen (1992) has modeled the congestion caused by through-traﬃc and by traﬃc destined for the area
where consumers park. To evaluate different parking policies, Bifulco (1993) introduced the parking search times in a static
stochastic traﬃc assignment model. Anderson and de Palma (2004) studied the parking problem under a private parking op-
erator in a monopolistically competitive market, with an emphasis on the commuter’s time spent on searching for a vacant
parking space. There is a branch of literature looking into the interaction between cruising-for-parking and traﬃc conges-
tion (e.g., Arnott and Rowse, 1999, 2009; Arnott and Inci, 2006, 2010 ). For example, Arnott and Rowse (1999) developed a
structural model of parking for a ring-road on which travelers’ choice of parking lot is uniformly distributed; the expected
parking time, driving time and cruising distance for ﬁnding available parking spaces are derived. These studies focusing on
cruising-for-parking have provided insightful ideas of the complex interaction among cruising, traﬃc congestion and net-
work performance. However, they often overlook the rush hour traﬃc dynamics and time-varying traﬃc conditions. For a
recent review of the economic studies of cruising-for-parking, one may refer to Inci (2015) . 
Another branch of literature has focused on integrating the parking problem into the well-known morning commute
model ( Vickrey 1969 ). In this context, Arnott et al. (1991) showed that a parking fee alone can effectively increase so-
cial welfare, and that a combination of dynamic road toll and dynamic parking fee can yield the system optimum. Zhang
et al. (2008) further extended Arnott et al. (1991) by deriving the daily commuting pattern that combines both the morning
and evening commutes. More recently, attentions have been paid to how parking capacity allocations, parking fees, parking
permits and parking reservations can be designed to improve traﬃc eﬃciency in a dynamic network with one roadway
bottleneck ( Zhang et al. 2011; Qian et al. 2011, 2012; Fosgerau and de Palma, 2013; Yang et al. 2013; Liu et al. 2014a,b ).
However, in most of these studies, the cruising for parking is not modeled. Very recently, Qian and Rajagopal (2014, 2015 )
modeled how travelers make parking location choices and departure time choices to minimize their generalized travel cost.
More importantly, they incorporated cruising-for-parking by using a cruising time function dependent on parking occupancy.
However, their study treated cruising time as a cost at the end of trip, but ignored the impacts of cruising-for-parking on
the roadway traﬃc congestion, as well as the interaction between cruising and moving traﬃc. By “moving traﬃc”, we mean
that the vehicles are moving towards their destinations, but have not started to search for a parking space yet. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst to incorporate not only the cruising-for-parking, but also its ad-
verse impacts on traﬃc congestion in the context of dynamic commuting equilibrium. Alternatively, this study explores
how interactions between cruising and traﬃc congestion will re-shape the morning commute. Following a recent macro-
scopic simulation study of parking ( Geroliminis, 2015 ), the impact of cruising-for-parking is modeled through an aggregated
network-level traﬃc model: the Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD), see Daganzo and Geroliminis (2008) for em-
pirical evidence. Different from Geroliminis (2015) , this study considers travelers’ scheduling cost and time of departure
choices rather than assuming given demand proﬁle over time, which bring much more complexities. By adopting the MFD
approach, one of the advantages is that the downward-sloping part of the curve between traﬃc ﬂow and density, known
as hypercongestion in economic terms (e.g., Small and Chu, 2003 ), can be modeled. The MFD approach has already been
used to study the recurrent morning commute problem without consideration of cruising-for-parking (e.g., Geroliminis and
Levinson, 2009; Arnott, 2013; Fosgerau, 2015 ). 
As mentioned in Arnott (2013) , the dynamic user equilibrium problem with hypercongestion is analytically intractable
(which is to solve a delay differential equation with an endogenous delay). To deal with this intractability, Arnott (2013) as-
sumes that the outﬂow from the downtown area depends on the contemporaneous traﬃc density, which is termed as the
“bathtub” model. In an earlier time, to solve the no-toll commuting equilibrium, Small and Chu (2003) assumed that a
commuter’s travel time depends on traﬃc density at his or her arrival time. This assumption is also adopted in some other
studies, e.g., Mahmassani and Herman (1984), Yang and Huang (1997) . Later, Geroliminis and Levinson (2009) extended
Small and Chu (2003) by considering user heterogeneity in desired arrival time, and incorporating various pricing strate-
gies to eliminate congestion. An interesting ﬁnding of this study is that the duration of pricing period is smaller than the
congested period in the no-toll case, and the total savings (in travel delay and scheduling penalties) are higher than the
total toll paid (note that in a classical bottleneck, these two quantities are equal). A simpliﬁed tractable version of the MFD
model considering capacity drop facing queueing is adopted in some recent studies on the morning commute problem (e.g.,
Fosgerau and Small, 2013; Liu et al., 2015b ). Unfortunately, extension of their models would lead to a tedious proliferation
of cases. Very recently, Fosgerau (2015) proposed a similar “bathtub” model as Arnott (2013) , given the heterogeneity in trip
length of the population. Some of the analysis in Fosgerau (2015) relies on that, for all travelers, the speed does not drop
too quickly at times of departure or rise too quickly at times of arrival. The paper identiﬁed that under some conditions, a
regular sorting property arises, where shorter trips take place within the durations of longer trips. In the current study, to
tackle the intractability, we approximate travelers’ travel time with instantaneous speed (depends on traﬃc density) and trip
length (depends on parking availability). With this “instantaneous travel time” approximation, the problem is signiﬁcantly
simpliﬁed and still analytically tractable. Later our numerical analysis can compare the difference between the analytical
travel time (calculated with instantaneous conditions) and the estimated travel time (calculated with the estimated depar-
ture/arrival traﬃc pattern). While a number of assumptions have been made to keep some level of analytical tractability in
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 the model, the analysis of this work contains interesting ﬁndings both from a mathematical and policy point of view and
could help policy makers in dealing with congestion and parking issues. 
Under the MFD framework, the traﬃc arrival rate at destinations or the outﬂow of the network depends on the traﬃc
accumulation in the network and the trip length of the traﬃc. The existing MFD models often assume that the trip length
is constant over time and independent of destination, and ignore phenomena which may change trip length, e.g., when
vehicles are cruising for parking (increase in trip length due to route choice is analyzed in Yildirimoglu and Geroliminis,
2014 ). In reality, parking capacity in the downtown is often limited. Moreover, due to travelers’ arrival, the available parking
capacity will decrease over time in the morning peak. It is then more diﬃcult for a later traveler to ﬁnd a vacant parking
space. In an average sense, cruising distance to ﬁnd a vacant parking space will increase over time, which leads to a decrease
in network outﬂow (arrival rate at parking spaces). Macroscopic models that ignore this phenomenon will underestimate trip
length of travelers and overestimate the outﬂow of the network. Furthermore, the increased travel distance due to cruising
will lead to more severe congestion in the network. If we look at the network traﬃc dynamics, given the future traﬃc
inﬂow, the decreased outﬂow due to cruising-for-parking would in return intensify the network accumulation in the future,
and then decrease the traveling speed of traﬃc and create more severe congestion. 
This study models the above interactions in the context of dynamic user equilibrium in the morning commute. Firstly, we
formulate the commuting equilibrium in a congested downtown network where travelers have to search for vacant curbside
parking spaces around their destinations. Since the cruising-for-parking would yield smaller network outﬂow, more traﬃc
congestion, and more travel delays, we develop a dynamic model of pricing for the network to improve eﬃciency, and
reduce total social cost including cruising time cost, moving time cost (where moving time is the duration during which
vehicles move to the destination but do not cruise for parking yet), and schedule delay cost. Our analysis shows that, due to
the consideration of cruising-for-parking, the dynamic toll to support the system optimum has a different shape (over time)
than the classical triangular toll in Vickrey’s bottleneck model. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem and presents the model formulation
and major assumptions adopted. In Section 3 , the morning commute equilibrium with cruising-for-parking is discussed.
Section 4 introduces the optimal time-varying toll to reduce total social cost and improve traﬃc eﬃciency. Numerical stud-
ies are presented in Section 5 to illustrate and verify the essential ideas in the paper. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper
and provides some discussions. 
2. Model formulation 
We start with a thumbnail sketch of the problem, and follow it with more detailed formulations. Speciﬁcally, we list
the main model assumptions of this work A1-A7 in sub section 2.2 , while some initial or boundary traﬃc conditions are
summarized as A8-A10 in sub section 3.1 . 
2.1. Thumbnail description 
We consider a downtown area, which exhibits an MFD with low scatter (a lower scatter requires that the congestion
is more homogeneously distributed over the network). Basically, the MFD of a network describes the relationships among
network vehicle density, network average speed of traveling traﬃc, and network space-mean ﬂow (or network travel pro-
duction). A formal deﬁnition of the variables is provided right afterwards. The MFD of a network or region can be estimated
with various real data (from loop detectors, GPS etc. see Geroliminis and Daganzo, 2008 and Leclercq et al., 2014 ). 1 In this
paper, the network MFD function is assumed to be given. 
In the morning commute, a number of travelers have to travel through the downtown network to reach their downtown
destinations. In this work, all of them have identical desired arrival time. All travel is by car and all parking is on street.
Before arrival, travelers need to ﬁnd vacant parking spaces to park their cars. Since all parking is on street, travelers will
cruise for parking on the street, which depends on parking availability. Indeed, there will be two types of traﬃc: moving
traﬃc (or in-transit traﬃc, which means that vehicles are moving towards their destinations, but have not started to ﬁnd a
parking space yet), and cruising traﬃc (vehicles are searching around their ﬁnal destinations to ﬁnd vacant parking spaces).
The traﬃc dynamics after taking into account cruising-for-parking are modeled through the Macroscopic Fundamental Di-
agram (MFD), see Geroliminis and Daganzo (2008) . By utilizing the MFD framework, we can model the downward-sloping
part of the curve between network traﬃc ﬂow and density. 2 
A commuter will choose his or her departure time to minimize the travel cost, which includes travel delay cost and
schedule delay cost. The travel delay includes both moving time and cruising time. We look at the long-term dynamic user
equilibrium such that we assume travelers to be aware of traﬃc conditions and parking vacancies after their long-term
experience. Equilibrium is achieved when no one can reduce his or her travel cost by unilaterally changing departure time. 1 The MFD of a network can be affected by, e.g., systematic changes of signal control plans, expanded roads (see for example Leclercq and Geroliminis, 
2013 or Geroliminis and Boyaci, 2012 ). 
2 While this study focuses on a single-region downtown network, the dynamic relations for traﬃc in a multi-region system with a known time-of- 
departure for all travelers and no cruising are described in detail by Ramezani et al. (2015) . 
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 We end the subsection with listing the notations we employ in the paper. Those listed as exogenous variables or param-
eters are considered as input to the model and can be estimated with ﬁeld experiments or surveys. 
MFD variables: 
n Accumulation (total number of vehicles in the network) 
n c Critical level of accumulation (exogenous) 
n jam Jam accumulation (exogenous) 
v Velocity; v = v (n ) (exogenous relation between speed and accumulation) 
v f Free-ﬂow speed (exogenous) 
P Network production; P ≡ v · n 
L Trip length 
o Network outﬂow; where o = P/L 
Exogenous parameters: 
N Number of commuters 
N p Number of parking spaces 
l m Moving or in-transit distance (identical for all travelers) 
d Distance or spacing between parking spaces 
p 0 Parking occupancy rate at the start of the peak 
t ∗ Desired arrival time (identical for all travelers) 
Endogenous variables: 
t Clock time 
I(t) Cumulative departure from home at time t
I ′ (t) Departure rate at time t; I ′ (t) ≡ dI(t) / dt 
A (t) Cumulative arrival at destination at time t
A ′ (t) Arrival rate at time t; A ′ (t) ≡ dA (t) / dt 
p(t) Parking vacancy rate experienced by travelers departing at time t
˜ p(t) Parking vacancy rate at time t
n (t) Accumulation at time t ( ≡ I( t) − A (t) ) 
ˆ v(t) Velocity at time t; and ˆ v(t) = v ( n ( t) ) 
ˆ o(t) Network outﬂow at time t
l s (t) Cruising-for-parking distance for travelers departing at time t
ˆ L (t) Trip length for travelers departing at time t; ˆ L (t) ≡ l m + l s (t) 
τm (t) In-transit travel time or moving time for travelers departing at time t
τs (t) Cruising-for-parking time for travelers departing at time t
ˆ τ (t) Total travel time for travelers departing at time t ( ≡ τm + τs ) 
T (t) Time-varying toll at (departure) time t
Note that the time-varying accumulation n ( t ) follows the notation n from the MFD variables. However, the notations
ˆ v, ˆ o, ˆ L and ˆ τ (all are time-varying endogenous variables) are adopted to distinguish them from relevant functions. Other
parameters and variables if not mentioned in the above will be speciﬁed in the text. 
2.2. Dynamic traﬃc model with cruising-for-parking 
Regarding the MFD of the downtown network, we employ the following assumptions A1-A2. The speed-accumulation
( v − n ) relationship deﬁned in assumptions A1 is also illustrated in Fig. 1. 
A1. Velocity is a continuous function of accumulation in the network: 
v = v ( n ) 
In particular, we assume that 
v ( n ) = v f f or n ≤ n c ;
v ( n ) > 0 and v ′ ( n ) < 0 f or n > n c and n < n jam ;
v ( n ) = 0 f or n ≥ n jam ;
where n c is the critical accumulation, and n jam is the jam accumulation. 
The above assumption A1 means that traﬃc ﬂows at free-ﬂow velocity up to a critical level n c , above which the velocity
declines monotonically as accumulation increases (before jam accumulation), reﬂecting (hyper)congestion. 3 Note that the3 The assumption (A1) also indicates that we do not differentiate the direct impacts of cruising and moving vehicles on traﬃc congestion. This is often 
not the case in reality. Vehicles cruising on the street might be slower, and might affect surrounding traﬃc when they try to park at vacant spaces they 
ﬁnd. Future research might model the speciﬁc impacts of cruising traﬃc. To achieve this, we should identify cars that are cruising, which can be diﬃcult 
as we need to track the state of every vehicle. However, from a system perspective, we might approximate the proportions of moving and cruising vehicles 
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 speed might not be differentiable while continuous at n = n c and at n = n jam . This assumption (A1) is adopted in many
traﬃc simulation studies, and empirical observations from Yokohama ( Geroliminis and Daganzo, 2008 and Geroliminis and
Levinson, 2009 ) suggest this to be a reasonable approximation. For later use, we here deﬁne v −1 (·) as the inverse function
of v = v (n ) for n ∈ [ n c , n jam ). Since we are focusing on the dynamic user equilibrium with cruising for parking, the accumu-
lation n will never reach the jam accumulation n jam (otherwise, travelers will have an unbounded travel cost). If at time t ,
accumulation is n ( t ), velocity is then ˆ v(t) = v ( n (t) ) . 
A2. Production P (n ) = n · v (n ) , i) increases with n for n < n c ; and ii) decreases with n for n > n c and n < n jam . 
Part (i) of assumption A2 holds as long as assumption A1 holds. Part (ii) of Assumption A2 implies that, for n > n c and
n < n jam , we have dP ( n )/ dn < 0. This requires that 
dv (n ) 
dn 
< − v (n ) n . The production P reaches its maximum when n = n c . 
The network outﬂow o = P/L would have the same shape (over accumulation n ) as the production P if trip length L
is constant. Note that o = P/L is a reasonable approximation (see, e.g., Geroliminis and Daganzo, 2008 ), which is used in
the ﬂow conservation equation for representing the network dynamics. In this paper, trip distance L depends on parking
availability, which is changing over time. Therefore, network outﬂow can be different even if the production is identical and
the o − n plot (we do not show it here) might experience hysteresis phenomena due to variable L . Moreover, even if the
production is at its maximum, the network outﬂow can be smaller when trip length is longer due to cruising. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the integrated problem of morning commute and downtown parking (on-street
parking) in the context of dynamic user equilibrium. This means that accumulation, traﬃc velocity, and parking vacancy
rate would all be time-dependent. Thus, during the journey of a traveler (both the moving part and cruising part), both the
velocity and parking vacancy rate are changing, which make the model analytically intractable (if without any approxima-
tions). The problem is that the exact model gives rise to delay differential equations with an endogenous delay (as described
by Arnott (2013) even for the case of no cruising). To circumvent sources of analytical intractability, we make the following
assumptions (A3-A7). 
A3. The moving time (in-transit travel time) for a traveler who departs from home at time t depends on the traﬃc accumula-
tion at the beginning of his trip (at time t): 
τm ( t ) = l m v ( n ( t ) ) . (1) 
Assumption A3 simply means that, given the moving distance, the moving time of a trip depends on instantaneous
speed (at departure time), instead of velocity during the moving duration of the trip. As will be discussed later, assumptions
A3-A7 together lead to an “instantaneous model”. In this model, we work with departure-time-dependent accumulation and
speed (rather than arrival-time-dependent) to estimate travel time as we consider that capturing the evolution of congestion
during onset is critical. (among the total accumulation) by assuming that they are proportional to moving distance and cruising distance (as brieﬂy discussed in Geroliminis (2015) , 
this is reasonable only if the system traﬃc conditions change slowly over time). Detailed GPS data (to identify if a vehicle follows a straight or circuitous 
trajectory) combined with parking occupancy measures that identify how often each parking spot changes its state from busy to available, would be two 
important aspects of a future analysis. 
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 A4. The parking vacancy rate for a traveler who departs from home at time t depends on cumulative departures at time t: 
p ( t ) = 1 − I ( t ) 
N p 
− p 0 . (2)
Eq. (2) implies that a traveler departing earlier will experience a higher parking vacancy rate as I ( t ) will be smaller. This
means that ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-out (FIFO) is implicitly assumed. It follows that the cumulative departure at the departure time of a
traveler will be equal to the cumulative arrival at the arrival time of this traveler. Also note that p 0 · N p parking spaces are
occupied at the start of the rush hour. If p 0 is larger, the initial parking vacancy rate is lower, and the cruising effect will be
more signiﬁcant. 
A5. The cruising for parking distance for a traveler who departs from home at time t equals the distance between parking
spaces divided by parking vacancy rate deﬁned in Eq. (2) : 
l s ( t ) = d 
p ( t ) 
. (3)
The above assumption A5 is inherently coupled with A4. We use parking vacancy rate in Eq. (2) (depending on cumula-
tive departure at departure time t ) to estimate the cruising distance of a traveler departing at time t (rather than parking
vacancy rate depending on cumulative arrivals at time t ), i.e., l s ( t ) depends on p ( t ). We consider this as a more realistic
assumption. The searching for parking occurs at the end of the trip, which means that the parking vacancy rate experienced
by the traveler departing at time t would be closer to the one when the traveler arrives. 4 If FIFO is assumed, when the
traveler departing at time t arrives, the cumulative arrival would be equal to the cumulative departure at time t , which
means the exact parking vacancy rate when a traveler departing at time t arrives at the parking would be as in Eq. (2) . 
Note also that Eq. (3) denotes an average searching distance for a given d and p , i.e., l s = d/p . We indeed follow Anderson
and de Palma (2004) , where readers can ﬁnd a detailed derivation. It regards searching for parking spaces as a stochastic
process with replacement, which means a traveler who is cruising for parking “forgets” whether he or she has previously
checked on a space. It is worth mentioning that alternative formulations of searching distance can be readily accommodated
in our model as long as the searching distance l s decreases with parking vacancy rate p , and is convex over p . 
A6. Cruising-for-parking time for a traveler who departs from home at time t equals the cruising distance for a traveler who
departs at time t divided by the velocity at time t: 
τs ( t ) = l s ( t ) v ( n ( t ) ) . (4)
Assumption A6 means that, similar to assumption A3, we use departure-time-based speed to estimate cruising time of
travelers. One may argue that cruising is closer to the end of the trip thus it might be more appropriate to use speed at
arrival time. However, analytical intractability would arise if we adopt different speeds for moving time and cruising time. 5 
The trip distance of a traveler departing at time t can be given as 
ˆ L ( t ) = l m + l s ( t ) = l m + d 
p ( t ) 
≡ L ( p ( t ) ) . (5)
It can be seen in Eq. (5) that L ( p ) is decreasing in p . From assumptions A3 and A6, we further have 
ˆ τ ( t ) = 
ˆ L ( t ) 
ˆ v( t ) 
= L ( p ( t ) ) 
v ( n ( t ) ) 
≡ τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) . (6)
From Eq. (1), Eq. (4), Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) , it is obvious that ˆ τ (t) = τm (t) + τs (t) . And τ ( n, p ) is decreasing in p , and is
increasing in n when n ≥ n c and n < n jam (since v ( n ) is decreasing with n ). 
At time t , total arrival at destination (as well as parking) is A ( t ), the parking vacancy rate at time t is then 
˜ p( t ) = 1 − A ( t ) 
N p 
− p 0 . (7)
At time t , the traveler departing at time t have not arrived yet, i.e., I ( t ) > A ( t ). Therefore, this parking vacancy rate in Eq.
(7) is smaller than the one encountered by the traveler departing at time t , which is given in Eq. (2) . The traveler departing
at time t is still far from starting to cruise for parking, and this is why we do not use the parking vacancy rate in Eq. (7) to
estimate the cruising distance (as well as the total trip distance) for the traveler departing at time t . 
A7. The network outﬂow at time t equals the production at time t divided by trip length for travelers arriving at time t, i.e. , 
ˆ o( t ) = n ( t ) · v ( n ( t ) ) 
L ( ˜  p( t ) ) 
≡ o ( n ( t ) , ˜ p( t ) ) . (8)4 We can expect that the exact parking vacancy rate at the departure time of a traveler (depending on cumulative arrivals at the departure time, as given 
in Eq. (7) ) can be far from (much smaller than) that at the arrival time of this traveler. 
5 If we adopt for both moving time and cruising time the arrival-time-dependent speed, one may also argue that it might be better to use departure- 
time-based speed to estimate moving time. It can be said that, since the departure time and arrival time are fully dependent on each other, formulating 
the problem based on either departure time or arrival time will make this “instantaneous travel time” assumption equally strong. We work with departure- 
time-based accumulation and speed as we consider that capturing the evolution of congestion during onset is more important and errors will accumulate 
less. 
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 Based on assumptions A4 and A5, the parking vacancy rate at time t given in Eq. (7) is the one encountered and experi-
enced by travelers departing at time ˜ t < t where I( ˜ t) = A (t) , and we have p( ˜ t) = ˜ p(t) . At time t , the travelers departing at
time ˜ t arrive. Therefore, the outﬂow or arrival rate at time t given in Eq. (8) is for the arrival of travelers departing at time
˜ t . The trip distance assumed to calculate outﬂow is equal to L ( p( ˜ t) ) = L ( ˜  p(t) ) . 
Assumptions A3-A7 together might be termed as an “instantaneous model”. 6 The most critical component is that we
assume “instantaneous travel time” (departure-time-based). 7 We would like to highlight that trip length formulation is also
departure-time-based. We use cumulative departure at the departure time of the traveler to estimate parking vacancy rate
and trip length experienced by the traveler (When FIFO is assumed, cumulative departure at the departure time of a traveler
will be equal to cumulative arrival at the arrival time of the same traveler). 
With assumptions A3-A7, the problem is simpliﬁed and the model becomes analytically tractable. Later our numerical
analysis compares the difference between the analytical travel time (calculated with instantaneous conditions, which is given
by Eq. (6) ) and the “estimated” travel time (calculated with the estimated departure/arrival traﬃc pattern). More speciﬁcally,
we compute I ( t ) and A ( t ) based on our “instantaneous model” (how to estimate the solution is presented in Section 3 ). And
the “estimated” travel time is the horizontal gap between cumulative departure curve and cumulative arrival curve. For a
traveler departing at time t 1 , “estimated” travel time would be ˆ τest ( t 1 ) = t 2 − t 1 , where A ( t 2 ) = I( t 1 ) (one may refer to Fig. 2
for better understanding). “Estimated” schedule delay costs then can be determined accordingly. Note that the “estimated”
values only appear when we want to compare them with the solution of the analytical model deﬁned by assumptions
A1-A7. 8 
Given the above formulations and assumptions, the full trip cost of a commuter departing from home at time t is given
by 
c ( t , t ∗) = c w · τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) + c s · ( t ∗ − t − τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) ) , (9) 
where τ ( n ( t ), p ( t )) is the travel time deﬁned by Eq. (6) , c w is the value of unit travel time, and c s is the schedule penalty
of unit time. 9 And the schedule penalty is c s = e for a unit time of early arrival, i.e., t ∗ ≥ t + τ ( n ( t) , p( t) ) , and is c s = −l
for a unit time of late arrival, i.e., t ∗ < t + τ ( n ( t) , p( t) ) . It is assumed that e < c w < l , which is consistent with empirical
evidence. 6 While in this paper the “instantaneous travel time” formulation is considered, a more accurate estimation of experienced travel time (e.g. as described 
in Yildirimoglu and Geroliminis, 2013 ) will not allow for analytical derivations. 
7 To approximate travel time with arrival-time-dependent accumulation and speed, we can deﬁne the t in Eq. (9) as arrival time, and let c( t , t ∗) = 
c w · τ ( n ( t) , p( t) ) + c s · ( t ∗ − t ) . Then we can conduct similar derivations as those in the current paper. This is indeed applied to estimate the solution 
presented in numerical analysis ( Fig. 7 (b)) where we compare our results with the solution based on arrival-time-dependent formulation. 
8 In Section 5 , it is numerically shown that the “estimated” travel time over the time horizon still follows a similar pattern as the analytical travel time 
under our approximation. Also, the discrepancies in system eﬃciency measures such as total travel time, total travel cost and total schedule delay cost will 
be less than 10% (user equilibrium solution), while we omit the detailed discussion. Indeed, a vast literature in travel time estimations indicates that errors 
associated with instantaneous travel times for smoothly varying traﬃc conditions might be in the range of 5-10% (e.g. Yildirimoglu and Geroliminis, 2014 ). 
9 In the travel cost formulation in Eq. (9) , the walking time between the parking spaces and ﬁnal destination (e.g., workplaces) is not considered, i.e., 
we only consider the driving time. If walking time is increasing over time (later arrival indicates parking further away), which is similar to cruising time, 
incorporating walking time will likely give us similar results as those from this study. However, with more detailed spatial consideration of parking, the 
walking time will be related to speciﬁc parking spatial distribution, and might affect how travelers are cruising and are choosing where to park. In this 
case, to incorporate walking time can be much more challenging, which is under our consideration for further research. 
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 3. Morning commute equilibrium with cruising-for-parking 
3.1. User equilibrium description 
If the parking vacancy rate p is constant during the morning peak, our study is similar to Small and Chu (2003) and
Geroliminis and Levinson (2009) . Dynamic user equilibrium is achieved when no one can reduce travel cost by unilaterally
changing his or her departure time. However, the time-dependent p would affect the cruising-for-parking and congestion
dynamics in the network, and then re-shape the dynamic user equilibrium. 
Compared to the standard bottleneck studies, this research incorporates a more realistic traﬃc ﬂow model to capture
traﬃc dynamics, which makes it necessary to describe the initial traﬃc conditions (this is common in traﬃc simulation
studies with more detailed traﬃc ﬂow models). Suppose the ﬁrst and last departures (from home) occur at time t s and at
time t e respectively, as shown in Fig. 2 (note that both time points are endogenous, and need to be estimated). We have the
following assumption for initial traﬃc conditions. 
A8. At peak start time t s , the accumulation equals the critical value, i.e. , n ( t s ) = n c (onset of congestion). 
The assumption above (A8) means that the onset of congestion is at the peak start time t s . This assumption ensures that,
based on the “instantaneous travel time” formulation, the ﬁrst traveler will experience free-ﬂow speed and zero congestion
delay. This is similar to the standard bottleneck model where the ﬁrst traveler also experiences free-ﬂow speed and zero
congestion delay. 
Between time t s and time t e (one may refer to Fig. 2 ), the accumulation will go beyond the critical value n c , and the
speed is below the free-ﬂow speed (congestion). At the time point of last departure t e , the accumulation will go back to
the critical value, i.e., n ( t e ) = n c , thus the last traveler will also experience free-ﬂow speed (based on the “instantaneous
travel time” ). Note that if the accumulation n ( t e ) > n c (corresponding case in standard bottleneck model is that the last
traveler will experience non-zero queuing delay), we can construct an equilibrium with a later t s such that n ( t e ) = n c , and
equilibrium individual travel cost is less. An equilibrium with n ( t e ) < n c also cannot exist. This is explained as follows. If
n ( t e ) < n c , there must be a small time duration just before t e where the accumulation will be less than n c . For travelers
departing during this small time duration, they all experience a free-ﬂow speed. Among these travelers, a later departure
indicates a larger travel cost (equilibrium condition does not hold), since a later departure means a larger travel time (trip
length is larger as parking vacancy will decline), and a larger schedule delay (later arrival). 
Between t s and t s + ˆ τ ( t s ) , there will also be arrivals (of non-peak traﬃc, i.e., the traﬃc already in the network at time
t s ), which are displayed by dotted line in Fig. 2 . To compute the outﬂow (arrival rates) during this time interval, as well as
the accumulation, we need the trip distance information of these non-peak traﬃc. We have the following assumption. 
A9. For the travelers already in the network at time t s , the parking vacancy rate experienced is p = p( t s ) = 1 − p 0 , and trip
distance is then constantly equal to l m + d/ ( 1 − p 0 ) . 
Assumption A9 gives information about the trip length of the non-peak traﬃc already in the network at time t s . For
simplicity, we assume that the trip length of them is constantly equal to the trip length of the ﬁrst traveler in the peak
demand N (who departs from home at time t s ). Firstly, this assumption assures that early non-peak traﬃc will encounter a
reasonably small cruising distance (and parking vacancy rate is relatively high for them). Secondly, alternative assumptions
on trip length of the non-peak traﬃc can be easily accommodated in our model. 
Furthermore, after t e , there will also be departures (which do not belong to the peak demand N ). These departures of
non-peak traﬃc can be less intensive thus we have n ( t ) ≤ n c and the speed is at its maximum. The outﬂow after t e , as well
as the accumulation is related to the departures of non-peak traﬃc. For simplicity, we assume the following. 
A10. Between t e and t e + ˆ τ ( t e ) , n (t) = n c . 
From the discussion after assumption A8, we know that n ( t e ) = n c . Assumption A10 then means that between t e and
 e + ˆ τ ( t e ) , the accumulation will remain constant, which indicates that the network inﬂow equals the outﬂow during the
mentioned time interval. However, we would like to point out that, assumption A10 is not critical to our model, as the
model can easily accommodate alternative assumptions, e.g., n ( t ) < n c during this time interval (non-peak traﬃc after t e is
very light such that inﬂow is less than outﬂow). 
The conditions assumed in the above related to the start and end of the peak might not be acceptable unless the peak
hour is signiﬁcantly longer than the travel time of a single trip with zero congestion. However, the model, while adopting
initial or boundary condition assumptions A8, A9, and A10, still incorporates the standard bottleneck model (with constant
highway capacity) as a special case. 
3.2. User equilibrium conditions 
We now derive the dynamic user equilibrium conditions. As mentioned, equilibrium is achieved when no one can reduce
travel cost by unilaterally changing his or her departure time. By taking the ﬁrst-order derivative of the individual travel cost
given by Eq. (9) with respect to t , we have 
∂c ( t , t ∗) 
∂t 
= ( c w − c s ) ·
[
∂τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) 
∂n 
· dn ( t ) 
dt 
+ ∂τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) 
∂ p 
· dp ( t ) 
dt 
]
− c s . (10)
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 Equilibrium requires that ∂c( t , t ∗) / ∂t = 0 , indicating a traveler cannot reduce his or her travel cost by changing departure
time. Then we have 
∂τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) 
∂n 
· dn ( t ) 
dt 
+ ∂τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) 
∂ p 
· dp ( t ) 
dt 
= c s 
c w − c s . (11) 
Note that in Eq. (11) , the schedule penalty c s is different for early and late arrivals. 
For the ﬁrst traveler departing at time t s , travel time is given by ˆ τ ( t s ) = τ ( n c , 1 − p 0 ) . The on time traveler departs at
time t μ, thus t μ + τ ( n ( t μ) , p( t μ) ) = t ∗, and ˆ τ ( t μ) = τ ( n ( t μ) , p( t μ) ) . The last traveler will depart at time t e and ˆ τ ( t e ) =
τ ( n c , 1 − N/ N p − p 0 ) > ˆ τ ( t s ) . The estimation of t s , t μ and t e , as well as the dynamic traﬃc equilibrium, will be discussed
later in Section 3.3 . With Eq. (11) and the boundary conditions described in Section 3.1 , we can construct the equilibrium
travel time proﬁle, which is given as follows 
(
ˆ τ ( t ) 
)∗ = 
{ 
e 
c w −e ( t − t s ) + ˆ τ ( t s ) for t s ≤ t < t μ
ˆ τ
(
t μ
)
− l 
c w + l 
(
t − t μ
)
for t μ ≤ t ≤ t e 
. (12) 
Eq. (12) is also depicted in Fig. 3. 
As mentioned, ˆ τ ( t e ) > ˆ τ ( t s ) holds (also shown in Fig. 3 ), i.e., τ = 1 1 −p 0 ·
N 
( 1 −p 0 ) ·N p −N ·
d 
v ( n c ) 
> 0 . This means that even
both the ﬁrst and last travelers can enjoy free-ﬂow speed and zero congestion delay (similar to standard bottleneck model),
they will encounter different travel times, due to cruising-for-parking. When there is no cruising, i.e., N p → ∞ , we have
τ = 0 . The above also implies that the last commuter experiencing a longer travel time (due to cruising) than the ﬁrst
commuter will experience less schedule delay cost as compensation. In an alternative way, to enjoy less cruising-for-parking,
commuters have to travel earlier and might encounter larger schedule delay cost. 
As all travelers have identical t ∗, for given t s and ˆ τ ( t s ) , the departure time of on-time traveler t μ can even be explicitly
determined by these two equations: ˆ τ ( t μ) = e · ( t μ − t s ) / ( c w − e ) + ˆ τ ( t s ) and t μ + ˆ τ ( t μ) = t ∗, which is 
t μ = c w − e 
c w 
(
t ∗ − ˆ τ ( t s ) 
)
+ e 
c w 
t s , (13) 
and ˆ τ ( t μ) can be determined accordingly. However, if t ∗ is not identical for the population, then the closed-form solution
of t μ is not available, and t μ has to be determined by numerically solving the equation t μ + τ ( n ( t μ) , p( t μ) ) = t ∗. 
The existence of the dynamic user equilibrium (as well as the existence of Eq. (12) ) relies on exclusion of extreme cases
with ˆ τ ( t e ) → ∞ . This is discussed as follows. Eq. (12) implies that the inequality ˆ τ ( t e ) ≤ ˆ τ ( t μ) holds, i.e., τ ( n c , p( t e ) ) ≤
e 
c w −e ( t μ − t s ) + ˆ τ ( t s ) . Suppose now that the network has to accommodate a relatively large demand where N N p → 1 − p 0 , the
parking vacancy rate p ( t e ) would be small, and travel time τ ( n c , p ( t e )) will be very large. The above inequality might still
hold, as under a larger N the peak may start earlier (smaller t s ), and t μ − t s , as well as e c w −e ( t μ − t s ) + ˆ τ ( t s ) will become
larger. However, the cruising distance function L ( p ) in Eq. (5) is strictly decreasing, convex over p . And it is unbounded
when p → 0. This means that the increase of τ ( n c , p ( t e )) resulting from a larger demand N can be much larger than that
of e c w −e ( t μ − t s ) + τs (please note that the slope e c w −e is bounded), especially when p ( t e ) → 0. τ ( n c , p( t e ) ) ≤ e c w −e ( t μ − t s ) +
ˆ τ ( t s ) will not hold then as N becomes close enough to N p . In summary, the existence of equilibrium requires that the
increase of travel time due to increasing cruising distance (even with free-ﬂow speed) cannot exceed the maximum travel
time increase allowed by the equilibrium condition. 10 
For given N p , there exists a critical t s and corresponding N such that ˆ τ ( t μ) = ˆ τ ( t e ) , and t μ = t e , and the last traveler
arrives at the destination just on time. 11 Denote the t s and N in this critical case by t¯ s and N¯ . For N ≤ N¯ , we can construct the10 The equilibrium travel time proﬁle (over time) depends on schedule preference of travelers. In our model, the equilibrium travel time proﬁle would 
always be piecewise linear (over departure time, as shown in Fig. 3 ). This determines the marginal travel time increase or decrease with respect to 
departure time. 
11 To identify the critical case, we can start by selecting a t s , which is close to t ∗ (but t s + ˆ  τ ( t s ) < t ∗), and estimating the traﬃc pattern according to 
the estimation procedure described in Section 3.3 (given in Appendix A ). Note that in this case N is not ﬁxed and indeed dependent on t s . As a larger t s 
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 user equilibrium solution. We would like to mention that excluding the extreme cases with N N p → 1 − p 0 and ˆ τ ( t e ) → ∞ for
equilibrium analysis is reasonable. If the cruising time is extremely large (travel cost becomes very large), from a long-term
perspective, people will shift to public transportation with lower travel cost. Thus, the equilibrium ˆ τ ( t e ) will be bounded
and never reach inﬁnity. 
We conjecture that the dynamic user equilibrium is unique given the existence. This is explained as follows. Suppose we
know the peak start time t s . Firstly, given t s , the time t e can be uniquely determined. This is because, for given N and N p ,
ˆ τ ( t s ) and ˆ τ ( t e ) are ﬁxed, and the ﬁrst and last travelers should have identical travel cost ( t e can be fully determined by
ˆ τ ( t s ) , ˆ τ ( t e ) and t s through the equation of identical travel cost). Secondly, given t s and t e , due to the monotonicity of Eq.
(2), Eq. (5), Eq. (6), Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) , the traﬃc pattern (both departure and arrival) can be uniquely determined. However,
the monotonicity of Eq. (6) and Eq. (8) relies on that during the peak, we always have n ≥ n c and n < n jam . More speciﬁcally,
the monotonicity of Eq. (6) relies on that v ( n ) decreases when n ∈ [ n c , n jam ) (assumption A1); and the monotonicity of Eq.
(8) relies on that P (n ) = n · v (n ) decreases when n ∈ [ n c , n jam ) (assumption A2). Note that empirical observations indicate
these two assumptions (on monotonicity) to be reasonable. Also note that, every t s corresponds to a speciﬁc travel demand
N (an earlier t s indicates a larger N , we observe this from numerical experiments), which is similar to Vickrey’s bottleneck
model. This means that with given N we then have a unique solution of t s . 
3.3. Computing user equilibrium 
We now discuss how to compute the user equilibrium solution. From Eq. (6) , we see that τ ( n ( t) , p( t) ) =
L ( p( t) ) / v ( n ( t) ) = ˆ τ (t) . As we know ( ˆ  τ (t) ) ∗ from Eq. (12) , the equilibrium n ( t ) can be determined as follows: 
( n ( t ) ) 
∗ = v −1 
(
L ( p ( t ) ) ·
[(
ˆ τ ( t ) 
)∗]−1 )
, (14)
where v −1 (·) is the inverse function of v = v (n ) over [ n c , n jam ). Later for ease of presentation, we may simply use “equi-
librium condition” to refer to Eq. (14) . But indeed, Eq. (14) is obtained by integrating the time-distance-speed relation in
Eq. (6) into equilibrium travel time proﬁle in Eq. (12) (derived from equilibrium condition in Eq. (11) and boundary condi-
tions). 12 
The estimation of network outﬂow ˆ o(t) relies on Eq. (8) , which also closely relates to n ( t ). The conservation of traﬃc
requires that 
dn ( t ) 
dt 
= dI ( t ) 
dt 
− ˆ o( t ) . (15)
It is worth mentioning that A ( t ) is the cumulative arrival of travelers belonging to the demand N . For t ∈
[ t s + ˆ τ ( t s ) , t e + ˆ τ ( t e ) ] , we have dA (t) / dt = ˆ o(t) , while for t < t s + ˆ τ ( t s ) , A (t) = 0 since no commuter in the total demand
N has arrived at the parking spaces yet. 
Computing the Dynamic User Equilibrium solution is more challenging compared to the traditional analysis of Vickrey’s
bottleneck model. This is mainly due to the time-dependent traﬃc conditions and cruising-for-parking. The estimation of
solution relies on simultaneously solving a system of equations (over the time horizon): equilibrium condition, traﬃc ﬂow
dynamics, traﬃc conservation, parking dynamics. We discuss the estimation of the equilibrium solution in the following. 
The estimation can be, technically, divided into two levels. i) The ﬁrst level is to estimate the peak start time t s , given
equilibrium is achieved for travelers departing at every t ∈ [ t s , t e ]. Note that given t s , time point t e is determined in the
second level based on n ( t e ) = n c (as discussed, this is required for equilibrium). For an intermediate t s during the estimation,
it is not necessary that I( t e ) = N (this should hold at the equilibrium solution). And the gap between I ( t e ) and N gives us
information on how to adjust t s . Simply speaking, we adjust t s in the way such that I ( t e ) approaches the target demand N .
ii) The second level is to estimate, given t s from the ﬁrst level, the cumulative inﬂow and outﬂow, and the rates of inﬂow
and outﬂow, parking vacancy rates, accumulation and speed for every t ∈ [ t s , t e ], based on equilibrium condition in Eq. (14) ,
traﬃc ﬂow dynamics in Eq. (8) , traﬃc conservation in Eq. (15) , parking dynamics in Eq. (2) and Eq. (7) . 
More details of the estimation procedure are provided in Appendix A . Roughly speaking, the ﬁrst and second levels cor-
respond to mainly Step 1 and Step 2 in the estimation procedure described in Appendix A . Moreover, we have highlighted
places where the mentioned equations of equilibrium condition, traﬃc ﬂow dynamics, traﬃc conservation and parking dy-
namics are exactly used in Appendix A . We suggest readers to combine with the ﬂowchart in Fig. 4 when reading the
estimation procedure. 13 associates with less traﬃc (similar to Vickrey’s model), in the beginning, ˆ τ ( t e ) ≤ ˆ τ ( t μ) would hold. We then decrease t s ( N will increase, as well as ˆ τ ( t e ) ) 
until ˆ τ ( t e ) = ˆ τ ( t μ) . 
12 In Geroliminis and Levinson (2009) , since p ( t ) is constant (without consideration of cruising-for-parking), the equilibrium n ( t ) can be determined 
explicitly with Eq. (14) given ( ˆ τ (t) ) ∗ in Eq. (12) . However, in this study, p ( t ) is dependent on the cumulative departure I ( t ), thus is related to n ( t ) proﬁle 
over the time interval [ t s , t ]. Therefore, n ( t ) and p ( t ) have to be jointly estimated. 
13 The time horizon is discretized into small intervals with identical length of δt for numerical computation. We adopt ε = 10 −3 and δt = 0 . 1 (min) in this 
paper for numerical analysis. 
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 4. Optimal time-varying pricing for the downtown network 
The user equilibrium experiences (hyper)congestion. And there are travel delays due to roadway congestion (high ac-
cumulation because of concentrated schedule preference and cruising-for-parking), and increased schedule delays due to 
competition for smaller cruising distance for parking. We now introduce a time-varying toll to minimize total social cost
including travel time cost and schedule delay cost. We consider that, a toll is a transfer of money from travelers to govern-
ment, but not social cost. 
4.1. System optimum 
We brieﬂy show in Appendix B that, for a single-region network, the system optimum (total social cost consists of travel
time cost and schedule delay cost is minimized) must occur at when the network is operating at the maximum production
of the MFD during the peak, 14 i.e., n (t) = n c and ˆ v(t) = v ( n c ) , and P (t) = n c · v ( n c ) . 15 However, this result relies on the net-
work MFD speciﬁcation in Section 2 (assumptions A1-A2), i.e., when the production is maximized (when n = n c ), the speed
is also at its maximum. Also, the proof presented in Appendix B takes advantage of our formulation with “instantaneous14 Note that the production is the veh-km travelled (of all the traﬃc in the network) per unit time, while the outﬂow is the rate of trip endings. The 
two quantities are associated with the trip length. When the trip length is time-dependent (depends on cruising for parking), even if the production of the 
network reaches the maximum at n c (as assumed in Section 2 ), network outﬂow might not be at its maximum, as a longer trip length will lead to smaller 
outﬂow. 
15 As shown later, to minimize schedule delay cost, an appropriate time interval of arrival should be chosen, as well as the departure. 
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Fig. 5. The time-varying toll supporting n (t) = n c . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 travel time” (which means that assumptions A3-A10 are adopted). This result is consistent with those described in Daganzo
(2007), Gonzales and Daganzo (2012) . If these assumptions are not valid, the system optimum might occur at n < n c , which
is explained in the following. 
Suppose that the network exhibits a different MFD than that assumed in the current paper (then assumptions A1-A2 will
not hold anymore), under which the speed is decreasing over n even for n under critical accumulation n c . The speed is then
not at its maximum when the production is maximized. If the network is operating at some n < n c where v ( n ) > v ( n c ), even
if the production and outﬂow might be smaller than those under n = n c (schedule delay will increase), the savings in travel
delay (a higher speed) might be signiﬁcant enough (overweighs the increase in schedule delay cost) to reduce total travel
cost. Furthermore, for multi-region cities, even if different regions have MFDs similar to that assumed in this study, more
complex control strategies to coordinate different regions have to be introduced (see, e.g., Haddad et al., 2013; Ramezani et
al., 2015 ) to achieve the multi-region system optimum. 
We now develop the optimal time-varying toll (note that how to implement such a toll has to be further investigated).
Let T ( t ) be the toll for the commuters departing from home at time t , individual full trip cost including the toll can be
written as follows: 
c ( t , t ∗) = c w · τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) + c s · ( t ∗ − t − τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) ) + T ( t ) . (16)
Similar to the User Equilibrium case, we take the ﬁrst-order derivative of Eq. (16) with respect to t , and let it be zero, then
we have 
∂τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) 
∂n 
· dn ( t ) 
dt 
+ ∂τ ( n ( t ) , p ( t ) ) 
∂ p 
· dp ( t ) 
dt 
+ 1 
c w − c s 
dT ( t ) 
dt 
= c s 
c w − c s . (17)
Suppose under the time-varying toll, the peak starts at t s , 1 , of which the estimation will be discussed later. For t ≤ t s , 1
we set T (t) = T 0 . After t s , 1 , to achieve the system optimum, we maintain n (t) = n c , dn (t) / dt = 0 . By adding this condition
into Eq. (17) , we have 
dT ( t ) 
dt 
= c s − ( c w − c s ) · ∂τ ( n c , p ( t ) ) 
∂ p 
· dp ( t ) 
dt 
. (18)
With τ ( n ( t) , p( t) ) = L ( p( t) ) / v ( n ( t) ) , Eq. (18) can be immediately written as 
dT ( t ) 
dt 
= c s − ( c w − c s ) · 1 v ( n c ) ·
dL ( p ( t ) ) 
dp ( t ) 
· dp ( t ) 
dt 
. (19)
With Eq. (19) , we can derive the time-varying toll to support n (t) = n c during the peak, which is given as follows 
T ( t ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
T 0 for t < t s, 1 
T 0 + e · ( t − t s, 1 ) − T p ( t ) for t s, 1 ≤ t ≤ t μ, 1 
T 
(
t μ, 1 
)
− l ·
(
t − t μ, 1 
)
− T p ( t ) for t μ, 1 < t ≤ t e, 1 
T ( t e, 1 ) for t > t e, 1 
, (20)
where T p ( t ) is 
T p ( t ) = 
{ 
( c w − e ) · L ( p ( t ) ) −L ( p ( t s, 1 ) ) v ( n c ) for t s, 1 ≤ t ≤ t μ, 1 
( c w + l ) · L ( p ( t ) ) −L ( p ( t μ, 1 ) ) v ( n c ) for t μ, 1 < t < t e, 1 
, (21)
and t μ, 1 is the departure time of the on-time traveler and t e , 1 is the latest departure time. For t > t e , 1 we set T (t) = T ( t e, 1 ) .
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 Fig. 5 shows the pattern of the optimal time-varying toll when the minimum toll is zero, i.e., we let T ( t e, 1 ) = 0 . 16 The
toll is non-linear over time since the impact of cruising is generally non-linear over time, i.e., T p ( t ) is nonlinear over time. 
17 
Indeed, −T p (t) in the toll T ( t ) is to compensate the loss of a later departing traveler with a larger cruising distance. If we
look into Eq. (21) , the compensation for one unit of additional travel time is c w − e for early arrival traveler; and is c w + l
for late arrival travelers. This is because, one unit of additional travel time indicates, besides one more unit of travel delay
penalty ( c w ), either one unit less early arrival penalty ( −e ) or one unit more late arrival penalty ( + l). 
Furthermore, the ﬁrst commuter would experience a higher toll than the last commuter, i.e., T o > 0 will hold if we let
T ( t e, 1 ) = 0 , as shown in Fig. 5 . This T o is to prevent travelers from departing too earlier and enjoy less cruising, thus to
reduce the additional schedule delay cost. 
Besides the toll to support n (t) = n c , we also need to appropriately choose the t s , 1 for the system optimum, which is
related to schedule delay cost. For different but given t s , 1 , if we implement the toll design in Eq. (20) , we will obtain
identical departure/arrival traﬃc pattern where n (t) = n c (however, they start at different t s , 1 ). The total travel time cost of
all travelers will be identical. However, different t s , 1 associates with different schedule delay costs. To minimize total social
cost, we then have to choose an appropriate t s , 1 to minimize schedule delay cost, which is to solve the following problem:
min : SC ( t s, 1 ) = 
∫ t 
0 
dI ( x ) 
dx 
· c s · ( t ∗ − ( t s, 1 + x ) − τso ( x ) ) dx , (22) 
where t is the length of the travelers’ departure duration, I ( x ) is the cumulative departure (inﬂow) at time t s, 1 + x , and
τ so ( x ) is the travel time for travelers departing at time t s, 1 + x . Note that as the departure/arrival patterns are identical under
different t s , 1 , I ( x ), τ so ( x ) and t in Eq. (22) are independent of t s , 1 . For t s, 1 
 = t ′ s, 1 , if we implement the toll design in Eq.
(20) , we would have 
t e, 1 = t s, 1 + t , t ′ e, 1 = t ′ s, 1 + t. (23) 
For t ∈ [0, t ], we have n ( t s, 1 + t ) = n ( t ′ s, 1 + t ) = n c , it follows 
I ( t s, 1 + t ) = I 
(
t ′ s, 1 + t 
)
, p ( t s, 1 + t ) = p 
(
t ′ s, 1 + t 
)
, ˜  p( t s, 1 + t ) = ˜ p
(
t ′ s, 1 + t 
)
. (24) 
Since ˆ v( t s, 1 + t ) = ˆ  v( t ′ s, 1 + t ) = v ( n c ) , we further have 
ˆ L ( t s, 1 + t ) = ˆ L 
(
t ′ s, 1 + t 
)
, ˆ  o( t s, 1 + t ) = ˆ o
(
t ′ s, 1 + t 
)
, ˆ  τ ( t s, 1 + t ) = ˆ τ
(
t ′ s, 1 + t 
)
. (25) 
However, the toll pattern over time would be different, i.e., T ( t s, 1 + t ) 
 = T ( t ′ s, 1 + t ) . 
Taking the ﬁrst order derivative of the objective function in Eq. (22) with respect to t s , 1 , we have 
dSC ( t s, 1 ) 
d t s, 1 
= 
∫ t 
0 
d 
dI ( x ) 
dx 
· c s · ( t ∗ − ( t s, 1 + x ) − τso ( x ) ) 
d t s, 1 
dx = 
∫ t 
0 
−dI ( x ) 
dx 
· c s dx . (26) 
Let t μ, 1 + τso ( t μ, 1 ) = t ∗ − t s, 1 , then t μ, 1 corresponds to the on time traveler, and it can be veriﬁed that d t μ, 1 / dt s , 1 <
0. With t μ, 1 , Eq. (26) can be rewritten as 
dSC ( t s, 1 ) 
d t s, 1 
= −e ·
∫ t μ, 1 
0 
dI ( x ) 
dx 
dx + l ·
∫ t 
t μ, 1 
dI ( x ) 
dx 
dx . (27) 
We then look at the second order derivative of the objective function in Eq. (22) , which is given as 
d 2 SC ( t s, 1 ) 
d ( t s, 1 ) 
2 
= −e ·
( 
dI ( x ) 
dx 
∣∣∣∣
x =t μ, 1 
) 
· dt μ, 1 
d t s, 1 
− l ·
( 
dI ( x ) 
dx 
∣∣∣∣
x =t μ, 1 
) 
· dt μ, 1 
d t s, 1 
> 0 . (28) 
Total schedule delay cost is minimized if we let Eq. (27) be zero, i.e., 
dSC ( t s, 1 ) 
d t s, 1 
= 0 ⇔ 
∫ t μ, 1 
0 
dI ( x ) 
dx 
dx ∫ t 
t μ, 1 
dI ( x ) 
dx 
dx 
= N e 
N l 
= l 
e 
, (29) 
which says the early arrival traﬃc N e should be l / e times as much as the late arrival traﬃc N l . This is consistent with both
the case without cruising and the case in Vickrey’s bottleneck model. 16 We would like to point out that the maximum toll might not always be experienced by the on time travelers (however, Fig. 5 takes this case as an 
illustrative example). This is explained as follows. Eq. (19) is the ﬁrst-order derivative of the toll with respect to time. For some t < t μ , cruising might 
be already very costly, thus | dL ( p( t) ) 
dp(t) 
· dp(t) 
dt 
| can be large, and dT (t) 
dt 
< 0 holds, which indicates that the toll will start to decrease before t μ . However, at the 
system optimum, the percentage of vacant parking spaces can be relatively large when the on-time traveler departs from home (early traﬃc is still much 
less than the parking capacity), cruising is then not very signiﬁcant. Thus, we have dT (t) 
dt 
≥ 0 for t < t ∗. Besides, for t > t ∗, it can be easily veriﬁed that 
dT (t) 
dt 
< 0 . In this case, the maximum toll will arise at time t μ . 
17 If approximating ˜ p(t) with p ( t ), and noting the cumulative departure (network inﬂow) is parallel to the cumulative arrival (network outﬂow) at the 
system optimum, it can be shown that the time-varying toll should be concave over time as L ( p ( t )) is convex over time. 
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 For given N and N p , denote the t s , 1 under which the last traveler just arrives on time by t 
1 
s, 1 , then t 
1 
s, 1 = t ∗ − ˆ τ ( t e ) − t ,
and denote the t s , 1 under which the ﬁrst traveler just arrives on time by t 
2 
s, 1 , then we have t 
2 
s, 1 = t ∗ − ˆ τ ( t s ) . It can be shown
that the derivative in Eq. (27) will be negative when t s, 1 = t 1 s, 1 , and will be positive when t s, 1 = t 2 s, 1 . Given Eq. (28) , the value
of t s , 1 that solves Eq. (29) will be within [ t 
1 
s, 1 
, t 2 
s, 1 
] , which means that the optimal t s , 1 is both lower and upper bounded.
The lower and upper bounds will be utilized to compute the optimal t s , 1 , which solves Eq. (29) , as discussed next. 
4.2. Computing system optimum 
Principally, the procedure for computing the system optimum solution is similar to that for user equilibrium solution.
This is because, traﬃc ﬂow dynamics in Eq. (8) , traﬃc conservation in Eq. (15) , and parking dynamics in Eq. (2) and Eq.
(7) are still valid. The major difference is that, for the system optimum, Eq. (14) representing equilibrium condition (for
user equilibrium in Section 3 ) will no longer hold. Instead, we know that the time-dependent accumulation should remain
constantly at the critical value, i.e., n (t) = n c . And we have an additional equation, i.e., Eq. (20) , to compute the additional
time-dependent variable, i.e., the toll T ( t ), which is to support n (t) = n c , as an equilibrium. 
The estimation of system optimum can also be divided into two levels. i) In the ﬁrst level, we use a bi-section based
approach to determine the departure time of the ﬁrst traveler t s , 1 , given that the traﬃc pattern with n (t) = n c for t ∈ [ t s , 1 ,
t e , 1 ] is achieved in the second level. Speciﬁcally, the determination of t s , 1 takes advantage of the result in Eq. (29) , which
states that the early arrival traﬃc N e should be l / e times as much as the late arrival traﬃc N l . ii) In the second level, given
t s , 1 from the ﬁrst level, we estimate the time-varying variables, i.e., n ( t ), ˆ v(t) , I ( t ), p ( t ), A ( t ), ˜ p(t ) , ˆ o(t ) and T ( t ) for all t ∈
[ t s , 1 , t e , 1 ], where t e , 1 is determined based on I( t e, 1 ) = N. 
To be more speciﬁc, ﬁrstly, we choose the initial lower bound t l 
s, 1 
= t 1 
s, 1 
and upper bound t u 
s, 1 
= t 2 
s, 1 
for t s , 1 , and set t s, 1 =
1 
2 ( t 
l 
s, 1 
+ t u 
s, 1 
) as an initial solution. Given t s , 1 , we can estimate all the time-varying variables with a similar approach as the
estimation for User Equilibrium starting from t = t s, 1 and ending t = t e, 1 where I( t e, 1 ) = N. However, instead of computing
n ( t ) directly through Eq. (14) ( Step 2-1-2 in Appendix A for computing User Equilibrium), we ﬁrstly compute the toll T ( t )
through Eq. (20) , and then compute the n ( t ) as follows: 
n ( t ) = v −1 
( 
L ( p ( t ) ) ·
(∫ t 
t s, 1 
c s 
c w − c s −
1 
c w − c s 
dT ( w ) 
dw 
dw 
)−1 ) 
. (30)
Eq. (30) comes from Eq. (17) , i.e., the equilibrium condition with tolling introduced. Note that as T ( t ) in Eq. (20) is deter-
mined from letting n (t) = n c , Eq. (30) will give us n (t) = n c . The other parts of estimation follow those for user equilibrium.
However, when checking whether the current t s , 1 is the solution or not, we compare the numbers of early and late traﬃc N e
and N l . If N e / N l < l / e , it means the current t s , 1 is too large, then we can set t 
u 
s, 1 
= t s, 1 , and update t s, 1 = 1 2 ( t l s, 1 + t u s, 1 ) ; If N e / N l
> l / e , it means the current t s , 1 is too small, then we can set t 
l 
s, 1 
= t s, 1 , and update t s, 1 = 1 2 ( t l s, 1 + t u s, 1 ) . The System Optimum
solution is achieved as | ( t u 
s, 1 
− t l 
s, 1 
) / t u 
s, 1 
| < ε. We adopt ε = 10 −3 in this paper for numerical analysis. The convergence of the
estimation procedure is numerically illustrated in Appendix C . 
4.3. Approximate solution for p ( t ) under the system optimum 
The following analysis provides an approximate closed-form solution for p ( t ) at the System Optimum. It is mentioned
that p(t) = 1 − I(t) N p − p 0 . With Eq. (15) and n (t) = n c at System Optimum, we have 
dp ( t ) 
dt 
= − 1 
N p 
· dI ( t ) 
dt 
= − 1 
N p 
·
(
dn ( t ) 
dt 
+ ˆ o( t ) 
)
= − 1 
N p 
· ˆ o( t ) . (31)
With ˆ o(t) = o( n (t ) , ˜ p(t ) ) , and with p ( t ) to approximate ˜ p(t) , i.e., assume p(t) = p( ˜ t) = ˜ p(t) , we have 
dp ( t ) 
dt 
= − 1 
N p 
n c · v ( n c ) 
L ( p ( t ) ) 
. (32)
Since L ( p( t) ) = l m + d/ p(t) , after some manipulations of Eq. (32) , we obtain 
l m · p ( t ) · dp ( t ) 
dt 
+ d · dp ( t ) 
dt 
+ θ · p ( t ) = 0 . (33)
where θ = n c · v f / N p . We then have 
p ( t ) = d 
l m 
W 
(
l m 
d 
exp 
(
k 1 − θt 
d 
))
, (34)
where W ( ·) is the inverse function of f (W ) = W · e W , and k 1 is determined by p( t s, 1 ) = 1 − p 0 . Eq. (34) implies that, with
information of d, l m , p( t s, 1 ) = 1 − p 0 , n c , v ( n c ) and N p , we can estimate the shape of the parking vacancy proﬁle over time
in the system optimum. 
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Table 1 
Summary of values of parameters and variables. 
Parameters or Functions Speciﬁcation 
Travel demand N = 60 0 0 
Initial parking occupancy rate p 0 = 0% a 
Total parking capacity N p = 6500 if not speciﬁed, indicating parking occupancy rate at peak end is 92.31%. 
Critical accumulation n c = 10 0 0 (veh) 
Travelling Speed v (n ) = v 0 · e −v 1 ·n (km/h) for n ≥ n c b 
v (n ) = v ( n c ) (km/h) for n < n c 
Speed function parameters v 0 = 68 , v 1 = 10 −3 , indicating v f = 25 (km / h) 
Trip distance function parameters l m = 5 (km) and d = 0 . 2 (km) 
Value of travel time c w = 9 . 91 (EUR$) 
Early arrival penalty e = 4 . 66 (EUR$) 
Late arrival penalty l = 14 . 48 (EUR$) 
Desired arrival time t ∗ = 200(min) 
Note: c w , e and l are from Tseng et al. (2005) . 
a Our numerical analysis assumes fully empty parking spaces at the peak start. However, the cruising effect can be signif- 
icant even for people traveling very early if we adopt a larger p 0 , and traﬃc eﬃciency improvement through pricing can be 
larger as the potential for reducing cruising time and traﬃc congestion is larger. 
b This speed speciﬁcation indicates that we have n jam → + ∞ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. Numerical studies 
In this section, we conduct some numerical experiments to illustrate and verify the models and analysis in the previous
sections. Table 1 summarizes the values of parameters and variables valid for the analysis. We consider the downtown
network with a total peak travel demand of N = 60 0 0 (veh) , and a critical accumulation of n c = 10 0 0(veh) , and a maximum
speed of 25(km/h). The travel demand can be generated at both the boundary and interior of the downtown network. The
peak travel demand is six times of critical accumulation, i.e., N = 6 n c . This indicates that, if we consider parking capacity is
inﬁnity, i.e., p = 1 , at the System Optimum, i.e., n (t) = n c and ˆ v(t) = v f , the departure or arrival duration of travelers in the
peak will be six times of free-ﬂow travel time. 18 
Travelers’ moving distance before starting to ﬁnd a parking space is l m = 5km , and the distance traveled in each trial to
ﬁnd a space is d = 0 . 2km . A single distance d is negligible when compared to l m . However, when parking availability is low,
even a very small d can lead to a very long cruising distance l s . A larger d indicates more cruising for parking and longer
trip length, which leads to more travel time and schedule delays (this can be veriﬁed with numerical experiments). 19 
5.1. User equilibrium 
5.1.1. Time-varying traﬃc and parking vacancy under user equilibrium 
The parking capacity is N p = 6500 in the benchmark case. Fig. 6 (a) presents the cumulative departure and arrival, i.e.,
I ( t ) and A ( t ), at equilibrium, while Fig. 6 (b) presents the inﬂow (departure rate) and outﬂow (arrival rate). Fig. 6 (c) and Fig.
6 (d) depict the time-varying accumulation and associated traveling speed, and the parking vacancy rate and associated trip
distance respectively. 
As shown in Fig. 6 (b), the network outﬂow (traﬃc exiting the network per unit time) decreases after the start of the peak
and until t μ= 149 . 5(min) , which is partly due to the increasing accumulation and decreasing speed as shown in Fig. 6 (c)),
and partly due to the decreasing parking availability and increasing trip length as shown in Fig. 6 (d). After t μ= 149 . 5(min) ,
the accumulation starts to decrease, which leads to increase in outﬂow shown in Fig. 6 (b). The impact of decreasing accu-
mulation (less congestion) overweighs the impact of the decreasing parking availability (longer trip length). However, the
network outﬂow at the end of the peak cannot go back to the level at the peak start, owing to the decreased parking
availability (100% > 7.76%) and increased trip length (7.58 km > 5.20 km) as shown in Fig. 6 (d). Besides, as travelers can18 At User Equilibrium with ﬁnite parking capacity, the peak duration will be even larger (more than six times of free-ﬂow travel time with inﬁnite 
parking capacity). By doing so, we try to reduce the impacts of the boundary traﬃc conditions at the peak start and end, as the peak hour is much longer 
than the travel time for the travelers departing at the peak start or end. 
19 Note that d is not simply the spacing between two adjacent parking spaces (e.g., less than 10 meters), but the average spacing of all the parking spaces 
near the destination, which depends on speciﬁc parking distribution over the streets and the network topology. For example, travelers heading for a speciﬁc 
building will consider to park at curbside spaces just around the building, or one street away (e.g., 200 meters), or two streets away (e.g., 400 meters). 
To check parking availability at different locations, cruising travelers have to drive to different streets (even worse, these streets might not be in the same 
direction). Also, even for parking spaces quite close to drivers but on the opposite side of the street, drivers might have to cover a long distance, e.g., make 
a U-turn. More importantly, as travelers have the incentive to park close to the building they are heading for, they may cruise around the building and 
wait for vacancies. This can induce more cruising. While this study relies on average and deterministic cruising distance based on parking availability for 
insights, simulation approach might be considered to integrate detailed cruising behavior and stochasticity. 
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Fig. 6. User Equilibrium: (a) ﬂow pattern; (b) inﬂow and outﬂow; (c) speed vs. accumulation; (d) trip length vs. vacant parking. 
Fig. 7. Travel Time Cost (analytical vs. estimated). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 enjoy smaller cruising distance (as well as the whole trip length) by departing earlier, there are more early arrival traf-
ﬁc ( N e / N l = 3 . 7 ) when compared to the case with inﬁnite parking capacity and zero cruising ( N e / N l = 2 . 4 ). Note that in
Vickrey’s model, N e / N l = l/e = 3 . 1 . 
As discussed in Section 2 , we approximate travelers’ travel time with instantaneous speed and parking availability. Fig.
7 (a) displays the difference (in the unit of monetary cost) between the analytical travel time (based on instantaneous speed
and parking availability, which is given in Eq. (6) ) and “estimated” travel time (obtained by calculating the horizontal gap
between the cumulative departure and arrival depicted in Fig. 6 (a), which is described in sub section 2.2 , after A7). Note
that, the travel time cost proﬁle over the time horizon in Fig. 7 (a) is arranged in the order of departure time. As can be
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Fig. 8. Costs and early/late arrival traﬃc vary with parking capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 seen in Fig. 7 (a), the “estimated” travel time is nearly triangular over the time horizon and reaches its maximum at time
t μ= 149 . 5(min) . This means, with our “instantaneous model”, the “estimated” travel time exhibits similar pattern (over time
horizon) with the analytical travel time. Furthermore, the discrepancies of system eﬃciency measures (e.g., total travel cost,
total travel time, total schedule delay) between the analytical and estimated values are generally small (ranging from ± 5%
to ± 10%, dependent on the parking capacity). 
Besides estimating the user equilibrium solution with departure-time-based accumulation and speed, we can esti- 
mate the user equilibrium with arrival-time-based accumulation and speed (the approach is similar to that described in
Section 3.3 , and this can be achieved by implementing footnote 7 ). In this case, similarly, we can compare the difference
between the analytical travel time and “estimated” travel time, which is shown in Fig. 7 (b) (note that the travel time cost
proﬁle is arranged in the order of arrival time). We can also rearrange both the analytical and “estimated” travel time costs
over departure time in Fig. 7 (a) according to arrival time, which is also shown in Fig. 7 (b). We see that the discrepancy be-
tween analytical and “estimated” travel times of late arrival commuters is signiﬁcant when we use arrival-time-dependent
accumulation and speed for estimation (note that the “estimated” travel time cost is almost an increasing function with time
as shown in Fig. 7 (b)). However, the “estimated” travel time still exhibits similar pattern (arranged in the order of arrival
time) with the analytical travel time when we use departure-time-dependent formulation. 
5.1.2. System performance under varying parking capacity 
Given N = 60 0 0 , Fig. 8 (a) depicts how total travel cost, travel time cost and schedule delay cost vary with the parking
capacity N p , while Fig. 8 (b) shows how the number of early and late arrival traﬃc and schedule delay cost vary with the
parking capacity N p . The x-axis in Fig. 8 is the ratio of N / N p , i.e. the parking occupancy rate at the end of the peak. 
As N / N p increases, i.e., parking supply decreases, the total travel cost, travel time and schedule delay will increase. This
is because, less parking supply indicates longer trip length and thus smaller network outﬂow. Fig. 8 (b) further shows that
the schedule delay cost of early arrival increases more sharply than the total schedule delay cost when parking supply
decreases. The reason is that there will be more early arrival traﬃc under less parking capacity (less late arrival traﬃc), and
the schedule delay cost of late arrival will decrease. In Fig. 8 (a), the case with N / N p → 0 corresponds to the situation with
no additional cruising, where the total travel cost reaches its minimum (4.507 ×10 4 (EUR$)). 
5.2. System optimum 
5.2.1. Flow pattern and travel cost under system optimum 
As discussed in Section 4 , an appropriate t s , 1 should be chosen to minimize schedule delay cost, thus minimize total
social cost. We start by considering that we can choose different t s , 1 , and then develop the time-varying toll described
in Eq. (20) such that n (t) = n c . Also, we consider that the time-varying toll should be non-negative (no subsidy), and the
minimum toll is set to be zero. This implies that we let min { T 0 , T ( t e, 1 ) } = 0 . Then, Fig. 9 (b) shows how the toll revenue,
social cost, and travel cost including toll vary with t s , 1 , while Fig. 9 (a) shows the ﬁrst and last tolls (tolls experienced by
the ﬁrst or last traveler respectively) under given t s , 1 . 
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Fig. 9. Toll revenue, social cost and total cost (the minimum toll is zero). 
Fig. 10. Flow patterns and costs at SO(a) and SO(b) based on departure time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 As can be seen in Fig. 9 (b), the social cost is minimized when t s, 1 = 129 . 3(min) , which is denoted by SO(a). This is
exactly the system optimum solution discussed in Section 4 (to minimize total social cost, which consists of travel time cost
and schedule delay cost), under which the ratio of early traﬃc to late traﬃc, N e / N l , is equal to l/e = 3 . 1 . The ﬁrst traveler
would experience a higher toll than the last traveler, i.e., 2.28 (EUR$) > 0 (EUR$). The time-varying toll to support SO(a) is
shown in Fig. 10. 
Besides the SO(a) to minimize total social cost, we here deﬁne another optimum in terms of minimizing total cost in-
cluding both social cost and the toll, which is denoted by SO(b) in Fig. 9 (b). This SO(b) is achieved when t s, 1 = 122 . 1(min) .
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Fig. 11. Travel cost without toll and travel delay cost (analytical vs. estimated). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As can be seen in Fig. 9 (b), the toll revenue is minimized at SO(b), and both the ﬁrst toll (experienced by ﬁrst traveler) and
last toll (experienced by last traveler) are zero. 
One can verify that the toll revenue is 25,580 (EUR$) at SO(a), which is 1.74 times of the toll revenue (14,710 (EUR$))
when total cost is minimized (SO(b)). However, by imposing the toll derived for SO(a) instead of SO(b) as shown in Fig. 10 ,
the social cost can only be reduced from 28,060 (EUR$) to 27,490 (EUR$). This reduction is around 1.2% comparing to total
travel cost under User Equilibrium (49,955 (EUR$)). This means, we may set a much lower toll other than that for SO(a) to
achieve similar eﬃciency in reducing social cost. 20 
Moreover, the individual travel cost is 8.87 (EUR$) at SO(a), which is higher than the that at User Equilibrium
(8.33(EUR$)); while the individual travel cost at SO(b) (7.14 (EUR$)) is less than that at User Equilibrium. This means that,
at SO(a), since the toll is relatively high, travelers are worse off compared with the UE, although social cost decreases. To
make every traveler better off, the system operators needs to refund travelers. However, the toll to support SO(b) is Pareto-
improving although no one receives rebate from the toll revenue. 
Fig. 10 (b) and Fig. 10 (d) respectively show the travel costs and tolls at SO(a) and SO(b), Figs. 10 (a) and 10(c) show the
cumulative departure and arrival at SO(a) and SO(b). In both SO(a) and SO(b), the cumulative departure and arrival are
parallel to each other, thus network accumulation remains at the critical level, i.e., 10 0 0 (veh), and the speed is at its
maximum, i.e., 25 (km/h). Also, the cumulative departure/arrival patterns at SO(a) and SO(b) are exactly the same except
that they start at different t s , 1 . Furthermore, the slopes of the cumulative departure and arrival, i.e., inﬂow and outﬂow
of the network, decrease over time (not very signiﬁcant as traveling speed is at its maximum) as the parking availability
decreases and trip length increases over time. 
For the System Optimum case, as the accumulation and speed in the network remain constant during the depar-
ture/arrival of travelers, approximating the travel time with instantaneous speed (at departure time) does not lead to any
inaccuracy. If we again compare the analytical travel delay with “estimated” travel delay (dashed lines in Fig. 11 ), we see
much less discrepancy than that in the User Equilibrium. However, discrepancy still arises as we still approximate the travel
time with instantaneous parking availability (which determines trip length). 
Fig. 11 also displays the analytical and estimated travel costs without toll (solid lines in Fig. 11 ). The discrepancy between
them follows the same trend as that of travel delay, which approaches zero for most of early arrival traﬃc, and approaches
the maximum (valued at one EUR$ in the example, which is 11% of the individual travel cost shown in Fig. 10 (b)) for the
last traveler. Note that, the higher discrepancy is only for a small proportion of late arrival travelers (moreover, there are
more early arrival travelers than late arrival travelers). Given these, we expect the time-varying toll from our solution to be
a good estimate (note that the toll is equal to a constant value, i.e., full trip price, minus the cost without toll). In addition,
the discrepancies in system eﬃciency measures such as total travel time, total travel cost and total schedule delay cost
will be less than 3%. It is worth mentioning that, if parking capacity approaches inﬁnity such that p approaches constant,
the discrepancy will approach zero for system optimum solution. This is because, the inaccuracy from using instantaneous
parking availability to estimate trip length diminishes. 
5.2.2. Cases of “underpricing parking” and “underpricing travel”
Fig. 12 further shows the user costs and equilibrium accumulation proﬁle over time under two different time-varying
tolls (red dashed lines in Fig. 12 (a) and 12 (c)) than the System Optimum toll (the toll to support SO(a), which is shown in20 This can be important in practice. Firstly, smaller toll may face less objection from the public, especially when the public can experience much less 
congestion. Secondly, the government can be wasteful in how it allocates the revenue it collects (thus we try to achieve similar eﬃciency with less toll 
revenue). 
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Fig. 12. User costs and accumulations: (a) costs and toll under travel pricing only; (b) accumulation under travel pricing only; (c) costs and toll under 
parking pricing only; (d) accumulation under parking pricing only. 
Table 2 
Various eﬃciency measures for three pricing cases. 
SO(a) Travel pricing only Parking pricing only 
Social cost (10 4 EUR$) 2.749 3.180 6.191 
Toll revenue (10 4 EUR$) 2.558 2.022 3.558 
Moving time (10 5 min) 0.747 0.973 2.069 
Cruising time (10 4 min) 0.510 0.618 1.741 
Schedule (10 4 EUR$) 1.430 1.473 2.486 
Early arrival (10 4 EUR$) 1.042 1.081 2.030 
Late arrival (10 4 EUR$) 0.388 0.390 0.456 
Ratio of N e / N l 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Departure duration (min) 76.8 79.8 99.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 10 (b)). Speciﬁcally, the two different tolls are: a toll considering only the travel pricing (and neglecting parking), which
corresponds to Fig. 12 (a) and Fig. 12 (b); and a toll considering only parking pricing (and neglecting travel pricing), which
corresponds to Fig. 12 (c) and Fig. 12 (d). As can be seen in Fig. 12 (a) and Fig. 12 (c), travelers will depart between the two
time points marked by the two vertical dash-dot lines (otherwise they will encounter a larger cost, see the red solid lines).
Fig. 12 (b) and Fig. 12 (d) display the corresponding accumulation and speed proﬁles for the duration with departures (i.e.,
the duration between the two time pointes marked by the two vertical dash-dot lines in Fig. 12 (a) and Fig. 12 (c)). Moreover,
Table 2 summarizes the relevant eﬃciency measures under different tolls. 21 By doing so, we aims to show the ineﬃciency
due to either underpricing parking or underpricing travel. 21 Note that to have a “fair” comparison, we adopt different peak start times for different tolls, i.e., the peak start time is chosen in the way that the ratio 
of early arrival traﬃc to late arrival traﬃc will be N e / N l = l/e = 3 . 1 , which is also presented in Table 2. 
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Table 3 
Various eﬃciency measures for different cases. 
UE with cruising UE (no cruising) SO(a) with cruising SO(b) with cruising SO (no cruising) 
Social cost (10 4 EUR$) 4.996 4.507 2.749 2.806 2.553 
Toll revenue (10 4 EUR$) 0 0 2.558 1.471 1.309 
Moving time (10 5 min) 1.732 1.657 0.747 0.747 0.748 
Cruising time (10 4 min) 1.128 0 0.510 0.510 0 
Schedule (10 4 EUR$) 1.949 1.770 1.430 1.487 1.318 
Early arrival (10 4 EUR$) 1.448 1.137 1.042 1.306 0.996 
Late arrival (10 4 EUR$) 0.501 0.633 0.388 0.181 0.322 
Ratio of N e / N l 3.7 2.4 3.1 5.2 3.1 
Departure duration (min) 97.2 92.9 76.8 76.8 74.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The toll (the red dashed lines) in Fig. 12 (a) is obtained by letting T p (t) = 0 (travel pricing only or underpricing parking)
in Eq. (20) , thus is piece-wise linear (just similar as the ﬁne toll in the standard bottleneck model, which is due to the
constant β and γ schedule cost setting). The peak start time is 126.45(min) thus the ratio of N e / N l = l/e = 3 . 1 . Fig. 12 (b)
then displays the corresponding time-varying accumulation at equilibrium (for the duration with departures only). As can
be seen, without consideration of parking in the toll, the accumulation during the peak can go beyond the critical values
(approximately for 80% of the peak duration accumulation is 250 vehicles more than the critical value 10 0 0). This leads to
larger moving and cruising delays (0.973 > 0.747 and 0.618 > 0.510), and larger social cost (3.180 > 2.749), as shown in
Table 2. 
In contrast, we also can only keep the parking pricing, i.e., T p ( t ) in Eq. (21) , and ignore the pricing for travel, which
corresponds to e · ( t − t s, 1 ) or −l · ( t − t s, 1 ) in Eq. (20) . This toll is shown in Fig. 12 (c), and the corresponding time-varying
accumulation (for the duration with departures) is shown in Fig. 12 (d). As implementing such a “parking-pricing-only” toll
would lead to congestion, when calculating T p ( t ), we need to replace the speed v ( n c ) in Eq. (21) by v ( n ( t )). Similarly, the
peak start time 88.74(min) is chosen thus N e / N l = l/e = 3 . 1 . As can be seen, the “parking-pricing-only” toll is non-linear, and
decreasing over time, mainly due to the nonlinearly increasing trip length over time. We have to point out that, this toll
is very ineﬃcient, thus social cost, toll revenue, moving time, cruising time (fourth column in Table 2 ) are all signiﬁcantly
larger than those under SO(a). This is expected as the toll pattern over time is quite different from that for SO(a). A very
important implication from these results is that, partial pricing (parking pricing only) can lead to very ineﬃcient situation,
which indeed highlights the importance of the proposed joint pricing (of travel and parking) model in this paper, especially
when cruising for parking cannot be neglected. 
5.3. Comparison of different cases 
Table 3 further summarizes different eﬃciency measures for ﬁve cases: i) User Equilibrium with cruising-for-parking;
ii) User Equilibrium without cruising-for-parking (parking capacity approaches inﬁnity); iii) SO(a) with cruising-for-parking; 
iv) SO(b) with cruising-for-parking; and v) System Optimum without cruising-for-parking. Note that cases (i) and (ii) are
described in Section 5.1 , and cases (iii) and (iv) are described in Section 5.2 , and case (v) is the system optimum under
Vickrey’s bottleneck model when parking capacity is inﬁnity. 
By comparing the UE with and without cruising (the ﬁrst two columns in Table 3 ), we see that cruising-for-parking lead
the total social cost, moving time, cruising time, and schedule delay to increase. However, the schedule delay cost of late
arrival decreases, which is due to the fact that travelers are departing earlier to enjoy less cruising (there is a sharp increase
in schedule delay cost of early arrival). By comparing the UE with SO(a) (both with cruising), we see huge reduction in travel
cost (44.98%), moving time (56.87%), cruising time (54.79%), and schedule delay (26.63%) from implementing the pricing. 
Besides, total cost including the toll at SO(a) is larger than social cost under UE with cruising, i.e., 2.749 + 2.558 > 4.996,
which means all individual travelers are worse off (as mentioned before, in SO(b) all travelers are better off, and in Table
3 we have 2.806 + 1.471 < 4.996). However, for the cases without cruising, total cost including toll at SO (2.553 + 1.309) will
be less than social cost at UE (4.507). This is consistent with Geroliminis and Levinson (2009) . 
Due to cruising-for-parking, there are more early arrival traﬃc, i.e., N e / N l = 3 . 7 for UE with cruising, which is larger that
N e / N l = 2 . 4 for UE without cruising. The toll to support SO(a) then prevents early departure of travelers and N e / N l reduces
to 3.1, which is equal to the ratio of late arrival penalty to early arrival penalty, i.e., l / e . This is consistent with our analytical
results in Section 4 . The peak starts later under SO(a) when compared to UE with cruising, and the peak duration shortens
as well, i.e., the departure duration under SO(a) (76.8) is shorter than that under UE with cruising (97.2). Furthermore, the
reduction of departure duration from UE with cruising to SO(a) or SO(b) (20.4) is larger than the reduction from UE without
cruising to SO without cruising (18.2). This is because, besides the moving traﬃc, the cruising traﬃc also beneﬁts from the
reduced traﬃc congestion in the network. 
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 6. Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper, we construct a model to capture interactions between cruising and traﬃc congestion in the context of
dynamic user equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, we formulate and analyze the morning commute equilibrium solution in a congested
downtown network with a focus on cruising-for-parking. During the morning peak, as curbside parking vacancy decreases
with time, the cruising distance and time for ﬁnding a vacant parking space is higher. Due to travelers’ competition for
smaller cruising distance (as well as trip length), the peak starts earlier; and due to reduced outﬂow when considering
cruising-for-parking, the peak lasts longer. 
A dynamic model of pricing for the network is then developed to reduce social cost, including cruising time cost, moving
time (or in-transit time) cost, and schedule delay cost. It is shown that at the system optimum, the network should be
operating at the critical accumulation with maximum production and highest traveling speed. However, the network outﬂow
still decreases over time as parking vacancy decreases and trip length increases. The optimal time-dependent pricing gives
the ﬁrst commuter a higher toll than the last commuter, which prevents travelers from departing earlier due to competition
for less cruising, and thus reduces total schedule delay of all travelers. Furthermore, it is proved that the total schedule
delay is minimized when the ratio of early traﬃc to late traﬃc is equal to the ratio of late arrival penalty to early arrival
penalty, even if the network outﬂow is not constant over time. 
While this paper considers driving as the only travel mode, the analysis in the paper can be extended to the bi-modal
transportation system with public transit as the alternative mode. In this case, besides departing earlier to enjoy less cruis-
ing time, travelers can take public transit to avoid cruising-for-parking. It is conjectured that similar dynamic toll can be
introduced to reduce traﬃc ineﬃciency due to cruising-for-parking and roadway congestion, and achieve the bi-modal sys-
tem optimum. However, if we consider that public transit service (e.g., fare, frequency) is responsive to the operating state of
roadway network (similar to those in e.g., Zhang et al., 2014, Zhang et al., 2016 ), the problem will become more complicated,
which is under our consideration for future research. 
This study considers that the distribution of congestion over the network or region is homogeneous. If this is not the
case, the MFD for the whole region might experience signiﬁcant scatter or hysteresis. Recent studies (e.g., Geroliminis and
Sun, 2011 ) have identiﬁed the spatial distribution of vehicle density as one of the important features that affect the scatter
and the shape of the network MFD. However, the concept of an MFD and modeling framework in the paper might still be
applied for the heterogeneously loaded downtown network if it can be partitioned into a small number of homogeneous
regions. Recent work created clustering algorithms for heterogeneous transportation networks (e.g., Ji and Geroliminis, 2012 ).
Besides, the spatial distribution of parking over the network can be an important element to be taken into account as it
affects drivers’ cruising. In this case, one possible way could be classifying the parking spaces into groups where the parking
is similarly distributed. Then we study how spatial distribution of parking can inﬂuence travelers’ parking choices as well as
traﬃc congestion. Also, we may consider garage parking in the extensions of the model. 
The current study is from a long-term perspective, and relies on the recurrent behavior of travelers. However, in reality,
travelers’ travel choices and traﬃcs are uncertain over time even if they are recurrent. Therefore, it is of our interest to
develop a dynamic congestion/parking pricing system based on both the information of recurrent commuting behavior (e.g.
distribution of travel demand over time which might be used for prediction of future traﬃcs) and real dynamic traﬃc, which
can maintain the downtown running at or at least near its optimum. 
In practice, many travelers may have employee-based parking spaces, or contract-based parking spaces, or reservation-
based parking spaces (for parking or highway capacity reservation, see, e.g., Liu et al., 2014a, 2015a ) and they do not have
to cruise for curbside spaces. In this case, the travelers can be classiﬁed into two categories: those with and without a
guaranteed space. We then have to treat these two classes of travelers differently to study the commuting equilibrium with
cruising for parking. Similar consideration has already been given in Yang et al. (2013) , and we expect similar results as
Yang et al. (2013) . 
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 Appendix A. Computing User Equilibrium 22 , 23 
Step 0 : initialize t s as t s = t ∗ − ˆ τ ( t s ) , and go to Step 1 . 
Step 1 : (check convergence of t s , and update t s ) 
(i) take the initial value from Step 0 , and go to Step 2; or 
(ii) if | ( N − I( t e ) ) /N | > ε, update t s by t s = t s − t s , where the t s is based on the gap N − I( t e ) , i.e., t s = e e + l · N−I( t e ) I( t e ) · ( t e − t s ) , and then go to Step 2 ; 
otherwise, the equilibrium solution of t s is achieved. 
Step 2 : given t s from Step 1 , estimate time-dependent variables n (t) , ˆ v(t) , I(t) , p(t) , A (t) , ˜ p(t) , and o(t) for every t ∈ [ t s , t e ] , where t e has to be 
determined during the estimation, based on n ( t e ) = n c . 
Step 2–0 : (check if t reaches t e , and if not, update clock time t) 
(i) update the current (clock) time by t = t s from Step 1 , and go to Step 2–1; or 
(ii) if | ( n ( t) − n c ) / n c | > ε, update t = t + δt , and go to Step 2–1 ; otherwise, let t e = t , go to Step 1(ii) . 
Step 2–1 : (given t from Step 2–0 , solving a series of equations together, which are equilibrium condition in Eq. (14) , traﬃc dynamics in Eq. (8) , 
traﬃc conservation in Eq. (15) , and parking dynamics in Eq. (2) and Eq. (7) ) 
Step 2–1–0 : (check convergence of I ′ (t) , and update I ′ (t) ) 
(i) let k = 0 ; initialize I ′ (t) by I ′ (t) (k ) = I 0 , and go to Step 2–1–1; or 
(ii) if | ( I ′ ( t) ( k +1 ) − I ′ ( t) (k ) ) / I ′ (t) (k ) | > ε, let k = k + 1 , and then go to Step 2–1–1 ; otherwise, let I ′ (t) = I ′ (t) ( k +1 ) , and then go to Step 2–0(ii) . 
Step 2–1–1 : (update p(t) ) 
With I ′ (t) = I ′ (t) (k ) from Step 2–1–0 , calculate I(t) , then compute p(t) = p (t) (k ) with Eq. (2) ( Parking dynamics ), and go to Step 2–1–2 . 
Step 2–1–2 : (update n (t) ) 
With p(t) = p (t) (k ) from Step 2–1–1 , compute n (t) = n (t) (k ) through Eq. (14) ( Equilibrium condition ) where ˆ τ (t) is from Eq. (12) , and go to 
Step 2–1–3 . 
Step 2–1–3 : (update ˆ o(t) and A (t) ) 
Step 2–1–3–0 : (check convergence of ˆ o(t) and update ˆ o(t) ) 
(i) let i = 0 , and initialize ˆ o(t) by ˆ o(t) = ˆ  o(t) (k )(i ) = o 0 , and go to Step 2–1–3–1; or 
(ii) if | ( ˆ o(t) (k )( i +1 ) − ˆ o(t) (k )(i ) ) / ˆ o(t) (k )(i ) | > ε, let i = i + 1 , then go to Step 2–1–3–1 ; otherwise, let ˆ o(t) = ˆ  o(t) (k )( i +1 ) , and then go to 
Step 2–1–4 ; 
Step 2–1–3–1 : with ˆ o(t) from Step 2–1–3–0 , update A ′ (t) and A (t) , and then compute ˜ p(t) with Eq. (7) ( Parking dynamics ), and go to 
Step 2–1–3–2 ; 
Step 2–1–3–2 : with ˜ p(t) from Step 2–1–3–1 , and n (t) = n (t) (k ) from Step 2–1–2 , compute the outﬂow ˆ o(t) = ˆ  o(t) (k )( i +1 ) through Eq. (8) . 
( Traﬃc dynamics ), and go to Step 2–1–4 ; 
Step 2–1–4 : with ˆ o(t) = ˆ  o(t) (k )( i +1 ) from Step 2–1–3–2 , compute I ′ (t) ( k +1 ) with Eq. (15) ( Traﬃc conservation ), and then go to Step 2–1–0 . 
Appendix B. System Optimum for a Single-region network 
Given our “instantaneous model” and assumptions (A1-A10), we now show that the system optimum for a single-region
network (in terms of minimizing social cost consists of only queueing delay cost and schedule delay cost) must occur at
when the transport network is operating at the maximum production of its MFD, i.e., n (t) = n c and ˆ v(t) = v ( n c ) , and pro-
duction P = n c · v ( n c ) , during the departure and arrival intervals of travelers. Besides maintaining n (t) = n c , as shown in
Section 4 , the peak start t s , 1 should be appropriately chosen such that the schedule delay can be minimized. While this is
a standard ﬁnding in traﬃc engineering and control community, where drivers experience only congestion delay (and not
schedule delay) cost, note that under different assumptions than A1-A10, the situation might be different. 
First, we show that travel time cost will minimized when ˆ v(t) = v ( n c ) . For ease of presentation, we arrange the travelers
in the order of their departure, then for the x -th traveler, the distance travelled will be L ( 1 − x N p − p 0 ) (based on Eq. (2) and
Eq. (5) ). Suppose the x -th traveler has a traveling speed of v x , the total travel time is then 
T T = 
∫ N 
0 
L 
(
1 − x 
N p 
− p 0 
)
v x 
dx . (B1) 
As v x ≤ v ( n c ), it follows that 
T T = 
∫ N 
0 
L 
(
1 − x 
N p 
− p 0 
)
v x 
dx ≥
∫ N 
0 
L 
(
1 − x 
N p 
− p 0 
)
v ( n c ) 
dx . (B2) 
We now explain that to minimize total schedule delay cost, we must have n (t) = n c during the peak. We now focus
on travelers’ arrival at destination, as schedule delay depends on the arrival. We arrange the travelers in the order of their
arrival, and at system optimum, the x -th traveler arrives at time t x . The outﬂow at time t x then is given by 
ˆ ox = ˆ ox ( t x ) = P ( n ( t x ) ) 
L 
(
1 − x 
N p 
− p 0 
) . (B3) 22 The initial value t s = t ∗ − ˆ τ ( t s ) is relatively large (the ﬁrst traveler just arrives on time), and the corresponding I ( t e ) would be smaller than N in the 
beginning. As can be seen in Step 1 of the estimation procedure (or Loop 1 in Fig. 4 ), we gradually reduce t s to achieve I ( t e ) → N . As I ( t e ) → N , the 
adjustment of t s , i.e., t s will approach zero, thus t s + t s → t s , which is numerically shown in Appendix C . 
23 In Vickrey’s model, as the early arrival travelers are l / e times of late arrival travelers, a more eﬃcient step size t s would be 
l 
e + l · N−I( t e ) I( t e ) · ( t e − t s ) . Here 
we have a more conservative step size, i.e., e 
e + l < 
l 
e + l , because we try to ensure that I ( t e ) will not go beyond N . 
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Fig. B.1. Cumulative arrival pattern over the peak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Based on the analysis in Section 4 , we know that at system optimum, the ratio of early traﬃc to late traﬃc should be
N e / N l = l/e , i.e., N e = l e + l N. This means that the l e + l N −th will arrive at time t ∗. This is shown in Fig. B.1 that the cumulative
arrivals (no matter how it exactly looks like) would intersect with the vertical line representing t ∗ at x = l 
e + l N. Then, we
have 
| t ∗ − t x | = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
∫ N e 
x 
1 
o y 
dy x ≤ N e 
∫ x 
N e 
1 
o y 
dy x > N e 
. (B4)
The total schedule delay cost would be 
T S = 
∫ N e 
0 
e ·
∫ N e 
x 
1 
o y 
dy dx + 
∫ N 
N e 
l ·
∫ x 
N e 
1 
o y 
dy dx . (B5)
As P ( n ( t x )) ≤ n c · v ( n c ), with Eq. (B3) and let 
o x ( n c ) = o 
(
n c , 1 − x N p − p 0 
)
, (B6)
where o( n, ˜ p) is deﬁned in Eq. (8) , we have ˆ ox ≤ o x ( n c ) . Then, 
T S ≥
∫ N e 
0 
e ·
∫ N e 
x 
1 
o y ( n c ) 
dy dx + 
∫ N 
N e 
l ·
∫ x 
N e 
1 
o y ( n c ) 
dy dx . (B7)
Appendix C. Convergence of estimation procedures 
Fig. C.1 (a) depicts the errors deﬁned in the estimation procedures for User Equilibrium, i.e., | ( I( t e ) − N ) /N | , and for
System Optimum, i.e., | ( t u 
s, 1 
− t l 
s, 1 
) / t u 
s, 1 
| , against the number of iterations, and Fig. C.1 (b) depicts how the peak start time t sFig. C.1. Convergences of peak start time for both UE and SO. 
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 evolves over iteration. In Fig. C.1 , for the UE and SO with cruising, N = 60 0 0 and N p = 6500 are applied, while for the UE
and SO without cruising, N = 60 0 0 and N p = 6 × 10 10 . ( Fig. C.1 is illustrative, we have tested different levels of demand and
parking capacities, and observe similar trends.) 
As can be seen in Fig. C.1 , it takes more iterations for the UE with cruising (number of iteration: 18) than the UE without
cruising (number of iteration: 8) to achieve | ( I( t e ) − N ) /N | ≤ 10 −3 . As shown in Fig. C.1 (b), for estimating UE with or with-
out cruising, by utilizing the information of the gap | I( t e ) − N | , and the average departure rate, i.e., I( t e ) / ( t e − t s ) , in the ﬁrst
few iterations, t s is sharply reduced and becomes much closer to the ﬁnal converged solution. The estimation of t s , 1 for SO
with and without cruising is bi-section based, thus the t s , 1 goes up and down over iterations, and gradually converge (11
iterations). 
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